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ENFORCEMENT OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSE BY
INJUNCTION, DAMAGE ACTIONS
AND DISCIPLINE
EVAN J. SPELFOGEL *
I. INTRODUCTION
The general purpose of a collective bargaining agreement is to
stabilize the bargaining relationship and to preserve industrial peace.
As we all know, the agreement is all too often a one-sided affair with
no-strike and arbitration provisions being the union's sole material
commitment. This discussion is intended to review the possible
remedies presently available to employers upon a union's breach of
its contractual no-strike commitment.
The potential remedies of subcontracting and rescission of the con-
tract for a material breach are not of sufficient practical value and
will not be discussed. The counterpart economic right of an employer
to lock out or lay off his employees has recently been upheld by the
Supreme Court in the Brow& and American Shipbuilding2 cases, but
in most situations neither of these remedies is particularly useful and
they serve only to escalate the dispute without also serving as a de-
terrent to future unauthorized strike action.
Section 8(b) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act and the
obligation of a union to "bargain in good faith" would appear to
provide unfair labor practice remedies including perhaps the seeking
of injunctive relief by the National Labor Relations Board under the
discretionary language of section 10(j) of the act. However, the
Supreme Court in the 1960 Insurance Agents case held that slow-
downs and other forms of economic harrassment, while unprotected,
are not per se unlawful. Then the Board itself in its 1961 Lumber and
Sawmill Workers decision,' which relied heavily on the Insurance
Agents case, nullified this approach, expressly ruling that a strike in
breach of a no-strike clause does not constitute a refusal to bargain.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the Board recently (1) has
found a union in violation of section 8 (h) (3) when it strikes to induce
a midterm contract modification without first serving written notice
* A.B., Harvard University, 1956; LL.B., Columbia University, 1959; Member,
Massachusetts, New York, United States Courts of Appeals for the First and Second
Circuits, and United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts Bars;
Member, American Bar Association, Section of Labor Relations Law; Formerly asso-
ciated with Office of the Solicitor, United States Department of Labor and National
Labor Relations Board; 'Associate, Simpson Thacher Sr Bartlett, New York, New York.
1 NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
2 American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
3 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
4 Lumber & Sawmill Workers, 130 N.L.R,B. 235 (1961).
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on the company and federal and state mediation agencies as required
by section 8(d) of the act, ° and injunctive relief may be available
under section 10(j) in this situation; and (2) has relieved the employer
of his duty to bargain for as long as the union's breach continues .°
Thus NLRB remedies, while not too significant, may not be altogether
foreclosed.
The balance of this paper will deal with the other, more practical
alternative remedies against the union's breach of its no-strike contract
such as court and arbitral injunctions, damage actions and the disci-
plining of employees. It must be noted, however, that under the
Supreme Court's decision in Drake Bakeries, 7 an employer, whose
agreement with the union contains a broad arbitration clause, must
submit the question of damages for breach of the no-strike clause to
the arbitration process rather than to the courts. Thus both discipline
and damage action remedies (which will be discussed below) will
probably involve an arbitrator's consideration of such factors as
employer provocation, union good faith, mitigation of damages and the
other many vagaries of the arbitration process. Further, if money
damages awarded months or years later were adequate recompense to
an employer whose business was crippled by a strike, employers pre-
sumably would not seek injunctions, nor would courts grant them,
since equitable relief is predicated upon the lack of adequate legal
redress. As Mr. Justice Brennan stated in his Sinclair dissent, " `[an
injunction] alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right.' " 8
IL JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
A. Court Injunctions
Ever since the Supreme Court's Lincoln Mills decision,° Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act" has served as the
5
 Sheet Metal Workers, 153 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (June 25, 1965).
6 International Shoe Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (May 19, 1965).
7
 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
8 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 219 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
quoting International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961). In the
course of his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan returned several times to this
point, emphasizing that ". . . the enjoining of a strike over an arbitrable grievance may
be indispensable to the effective enforcement of an arbitration scheme in a collective
agreement;. thus the power to grant that injunctive remedy may be essential to the
uncrippled performance of the Court's function under § 301." Id. at 216-17. And, " 'to
hold otherwise would obviously do violence to accepted principles of traditional con-
tract law. Even more in point, a contrary view would be completely at odds with the
basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral process as a substitute
for economic warfare.' " Id. at 217, n.2, quoting Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
9
 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
lo 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 185 (1964).
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foundation for a body of "federal common law" fashioned by the
federal courts with regard to contractual obligations arising under
collective bargaining agreements. However, neither the act nor high
court judicial decisions before 1962 dealt with the nature of the
remedies available to an aggrieved party to a labor contract. In the
1962 Charles Dowd Box Co. case,' the Supreme Court ruled that state
courts were not deprived of jurisdiction over disputes involving the
breach of a collective bargaining agreement and that federal and state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction in this area. In the same year the
Supreme Court, in the Lucas Flour case," stated that while both
federal and state courts have jurisdiction over such cases, federal sub-
stantive law must be applied to insure uniformity throughout the
judicial system.
Thus the state of the law in 1962 regarding judicial enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements may be summarized as follows:
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act grants to the federal courts
authority to write a body of substantive law to enforce collective bar-
gaining agreements and to decide cases arising thereunder; the states
retain concurrent jurisdiction to decide such cases; in so doing, how-
ever, the states must apply the federal substantive law.
Then, in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson," the Supreme Court ruled
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act" prohibited a federal court from
granting injunctive relief against a strike by a union in breach of a
collective bargaining agreement. As a result of the Sinclair decision, a
basic conflict (as outlined by Mr. Justice Brennan dissenting in Sin-
clair) has arisen between the Lincoln Mills concept, contemplating the
development of a uniform national labor policy on the one hand, and
the Steelworker trilogy concept of a more effective enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements on the other."
It is well known that the no-strike clause is normally about the
only meaningful promise made by a union in the entire contract. If the
Supreme Court's Sinclair decision is applicable to the state courts and
precludes their granting injunctive relief, there is little purpose, from
the employer's point of view, in obtaining the no-strike contract
provisions.
The key questions in light of Sinclair and the various conflicting
state and federal decisions are:
11 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
22
 Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
13 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
14 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
15 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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(1) Whether state courts may still enjoin labor union
activities which violate a no-strike provision in a collective
bargaining agreement; and
(2) If state courts may so enjoin, can a labor union
remove such actions to the proper federal district court where
injunctive relief is unavailable due to the restrictions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.
It should be observed that, prior to Sinclair, the courts of at least
ten states had granted injunctions against strikes in breach of collective
bargaining agreements. These decisions were based essentially on the
grounds that (1) such disputes concerned pure contract law involving
the states' fundamental and inherent equity jurisdiction, and (2) the
principal purpose of Taft-Hartley was to encourage the negotiation and
effective enforcement of collective bargaining agreements." Perhaps
the best pre-Sinclair pronouncement on the subject was Justice Tray-
nor's widely cited majority opinion in McCarroll v. Los Angeles County
Dist. Council of Carpenters," which enunciated the principles that
formed the foundation for Mr. Justice Brennan's Sinclair dissent18 and
provided the basis for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 1965 Shaw
decision."
In McCarroll, the employer brought an action for damages and an
injunction against a strike in breach of a collective agreement. The
union, relying inter alia upon the "pre-emption" doctrine, urged (1)
that exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the NLRB inasmuch as its
actions arguably constituted unfair labor practices, and (2) that,
alternatively, exclusive jurisdiction had been vested in the federal
courts by virtue of Section 301 of Taft-Hartley and Lincoln Mills.
Justice Traynor, in language foreshadowing to a substantial degree
several later United States Supreme Court decisions," ruled that (1)
16
 Lion Oil Co. v. Marsh, 220 Ark. 678, 249 S.W.2d 569 (1952) ; McCarroll v. Los
Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) ; Armour & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, Sup. Ct.
No. 38795, Dist. Ct. Minn., June 7, 1962; Anchor Motor Freight N.Y. Corp. v. Local
445, 12 Misc. 2d 757, 171 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 5 App. Div. 2d 899, 171
N.Y.S.2d 511 (1958); General Elec. Co. v. International Union, UAW, 93 Ohio App. 139,
108 N.E.2d 211 (1952), aff'd, 158 Ohio St. 555, 110 N.E.2d 424 (1953); Weisfield's, Inc.
v. Haeckel, 28 L.R.R.M. 2055 (1951); Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 382 Pa. 326, 115 A.2d 733, cert, denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1955);
General Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n v. Local 542, 370 Pa. 73, 87 A.2d 250 (1952); Inter-
national Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Galveston Maritime Ass'n, 50 L.R.R.M. 2172 (1962);
Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v. Trout, 59 Wash. 2d 90, 366 P.2d 16
(1961).
17 Supra note 16.
18 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, supra note 13, at 215.
10
 Shaw Elec. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 58 L.R.R.M. 2852
(March 22, 1965).
20
 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,
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the breach of contract did not per se constitute an unfair labor
practice; (2) neither the federal courts nor the NLRB possessed exclu-
sive jurisdiction; and (3) section 301, rather than excluding state court
action, provided an additional forum for such disputes. Furthermore,
he stated that although state courts were required to apply the federal
substantive law in enforcing federal rights in this area, they were not
necessarily limited to federal remedies. In regard to the availability of
equitable relief, Justice Traynor concluded that Congress must take the
state courts as it finds them."
Following Justice Traynor's lead, and despite Sinclair, state
courts, ever jealous of their jurisdiction and prerogatives, have been
reluctant to abdicate the traditional state injunctive relief remedies
merely because the United States Supreme Court refused to allow the
federal courts this privilege. Thus, in eleven cases since Sinclair, courts
in five states (California, Florida, Illinois, New York and Penn-
sylvania) have enjoined picketing in breach of the contract, declining
to follow the federal rule." Especially noteworthy is the following
brief excerpt from a recent opinion of New York Supreme Court
Justice Supple:"
It is now settled that section 807 Labor Law [New York
Anti-Injunction Law] is not violated when an injunction
issues against a violation of a no-strike clause in a
contract. . . .
The federal preemption argument also has no application
to the fact situation here presented [citing Carey v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261] . . . . [even though] in the
instant matter the employer has filed unfair labor practice
charges with the National Labor Relations Board [which are
still pending] . . . . (Emphasis added.)
supra note 13; Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., supra note 12; Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, supra note 11; NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, supra note 3.
21 McCarron v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, supra note 16,
at 62, 315 P.2d at 331.
22
 United Concrete Pipe Corp. v. Local 89, 58 L.R.R.M. 2172 (1964) ; RCA v.
Local 780, 160 So. 2d 150 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 169 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965); Gilmour v. Local 74, 54 L.R.R.M. 2457 (Ill. 1963); C.D.
Perry & Son, Inc. v. Robilotto, 39 Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd,
23 App. Div. 2d 949, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965); Employers Ass'n v. Operating Eng'rs, 60
L.R.R.M. 2006 (April 21, 1965); Lithograph Corp. v. Lithographers' Union, 59 L.R.R.M.
2678 (June 28, 1965); Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers,
Civil No, 7373/65, N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 20, 1965; Stroehmann Bros. v. Doe, Index
No. 26254, Spec. Term Erie County, N.Y., July 27, 1965; Price Erecting Co. v. Robilotto,
Cal. No. 224, Spec. Term Albany County, N.Y., Oct. 23, 1964; Dairymen's League
Co-op. Ass'n v. Conrad, 33 Misc. 2d 914, 228 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 16 App. Div.
2d 869 (1962); Shaw Elec. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, supra note 19.
23
 Employers Main v. Operating Eng'rs, supra note 22, at 2007.
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Analysis of these various opinions discloses the inherent reluc-
tance of the state courts to relinquish traditional powers in this area
and the extent to which the courts have drawn upon the McCarron
rationale and upon Justice Brennan's dissent in Sinclair. But the
following passages from the majority opinion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's Shaw decision perhaps best sum up what may be
described as the "majority view" today:"
The opinion in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.
502, 82 S. Ct. 519, 49 LRRM 2619 (1962), reinforces our
conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit the juris-
diction of state courts by passage of Section 301 [Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947]. The Supreme Court
recognized that Congress was completely familiar with the
laws of the various states as well as the availability of relief,
the alternate means of recovery, and the scope of remedies
with respect to suits involving bargaining contracts. The
Court noted that the "clear implication of the entire record of
the congressional debates in both 1946 and 1947 is that the
purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the federal district
courts was not to displace, but to supplement, the thoroughly
considered jurisdiction of the courts of the various States
over contracts made by labor organizations" 
Nor do the policies underlying the Supreme Court's decision
in ... Lucas Flour Co., supra, require the anti-injunction
restriction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to be read as a
limitation on state proceedings. In holding that Section 301
mandates the use of substantive principles of federal labor
law, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of
uniformity in the interpretation of contractual provisions as
the rationale for its conclusion. However, different meanings
with respect to the same contractual terms would not result
from the exercise of the historic state judicial power to grant
injunctive remedies . .
It is true that the [Norris-LaGuardia] Act expresses a con-
gressional policy against injunctions, but only injunctions
granted by federal courts. Congressional enactment of Section
301, without amendment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, with
Congress fully aware of state court remedies, strongly indi-
cates reaffirmance of existing federal labor policies which
limit the injunctive jurisdiction of federal courts, but which
do not attempt to limit that of state courts.
24
 Shaw Elec. Co. v. International Ind. of Elec. Workers, supra note 19 at 2855-56.
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There is, however, contrary authority. In a 1962 decision, Com-
mercial Can Corp. v. Local 810, the New Jersey Superior Court, in a
thorough opinion in which the state and federal authorites, writers and
law reviews are scanned and carefully evaluated, decided that a strike
contrary to the terms of a labor contract was a labor dispute which
could not be enjoined under the New Jersey statute forbidding injunc-
tions in cases involving labor disputes. 25
More recently, in 1964, the same court again denied an injunction
against a breach of a collective bargaining agreement on the ground
that "in light of the preceding statements of the United States Supreme
Court [in Lucas Flour], this Court believes that it must either apply
the Norris-LaGuardia Act . . . directly . . . or at least interpret our
own Anti-Injunction Act in light of the Norris-LaGuardia Act so that
it is not incompatible with it" and "The Norris-LaGuardia Act is
certainly part of the federal labor policy and as such must get
primary consideration in any suit for an injunction under section 301
[i.e., Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 301]." 20
The Maryland Court of Appeals, relying heavily on the New
Jersey rule as enunciated in the Commercial Can case, decided in
accordance with the New Jersey and the federal rule that the Maryland
Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the granting of an injunction against
a strike in breach of a no-strike clause in the union contract. 27
Who is right? Or in a more realistic vein, who is a better prophet
of United States Supreme Court decisions—the Pennsylvania and
California Supreme Courts, together with a handful of lower court
judges in Texas, Washington, Illinois, Ohio, Arkansas, Oregon, New
York, Florida and Minnesota, or New Jersey trial judges and the
Maryland Court of Appeals? Until the Supreme Court resolves this
problem which it expressly left open in the Dowd Box case, the labor
practitioner—especially one whose clients do business in more than
one state—must (1) be familiar with the rules as they are applied in
the various state jurisdictions and (2) consider the problem of removal
to the federal courts of a petition filed in a particular state court.
B. The Right to Remove to Federal Courts
Justice Brennan saw clearly in his dissent in Sinclair that, if
unions lost the argument that the rule in Sinclair applied to state
25 Commercial Can Corp. v. Local 810, Steel Fabricators & Warehousemen, 61 N.J.
Super. 369, 160 A.2d 855 (1960).
28 Independent Oil Workers v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 85 N.J. Super. 453, 458, 205
A.2d 78, 82 (1964). See also Lamena v. Camden Local 396, 80 N.J. Super. 203, 193 A.2d
285 (1963).
27 Tidewater Express Lines v. Freight Drivers Local, 230 Md. 450, 187 A.2d 685
(1963).
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courts, their attorneys would immediately attempt to remove the
breach of contract suit to the proper federal courts.
The federal removal statute reads in pertinent part as follows: 2°
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which
the district courts of the United States have original juris-
diction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,
to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is
pending . . . .
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of
action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is
joined with one or more otherwise nonremovable claims or
causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its dis-
cretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its
original jurisdiction.
Accordingly, if a case is within the original jurisdiction of the
federal district court, the defendants may remove the case from a state
to a federal court. Suits for an alleged violation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement are within this jurisdiction by virtue of Section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act. Obviously, because of the Sinclair decision,
at least until its applicability to state court injunction powers is
resolved, a union, as the defendant in a state court injunction suit for
violation of a no-strike clause, could petition for removal to the federal
district court under this section. The theory is that the action is one
within the federal court's original jurisdiction under the breach of
contract provisions of section 301. Whether removal should be allowed
depends ultimately upon the meaning given the term "jurisdiction"
within Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The question is whether
the act divests courts of subject matter jurisdiction, that is, the
capacity to take cognizance of or to entertain the suit; or whether the
act merely allows the court to hear the dispute, but strips it of the
power to grant injunctive relief.
It should be noted that Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
states that the act is concerned with the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States and contains limitations upon jurisdiction of the
federal courts.2° The first sentence of the anti-injunction provision in
section 4 begins:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
28
 Removal Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (c) (1964).
20 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
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in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute... .
(Emphasis supplied.) 30
Section 13(d) of the act provides:
The term "court of the United States" means any court
of the United States whose jurisdiction has been or may be
conferred or defined or limited by Act of Congress, including
the courts of the District of Columbia.'
There are many cases which indicate that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act refers only to the courts of the United States," and at least one
Supreme Court Justice has stated that the act "explicitly applied only
to the authority of the United States courts to issue a restraining order
or injunction. All other remedies in federal courts and all remedies in
state courts remain available." 33
Be that as it may, federal courts which have passed on the point
show a split on the removal question almost as sharp as the disagree-
ment among courts as to whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act, through
Sinclair, deprives state courts of the right to grant injunctive relief
against breaches of a labor contract.
Prior to Sinclair, federal courts in at least seven states had denied
removal of state court suits for breach of contract strike injunctions
and remanded to the state courts for further proceedings. 34 In addition,
the Sixth Circuit appears to have concluded that this type of action was
not one over which federal courts possessed original jurisdiction, and
it, too, favored remand."
30 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
al 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1964).
22 See, e.g., Sinclair Ref. Co, v. Atkinson, supra note 13; Marine Cooks v. Panama
S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria &
W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941);
Milk Wagon Drivers v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc,, 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
33 Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction 220 (1929).
34 Armour & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, Civil No. 3-62-129, D. Minn.,
June 13, 1962; Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D.
Colo. 1959); Pennsylvania Garment Mfg. Ass'n v. Newman, Civil No. 23164, E.D. Pa.,
Sept. 4, 1957; Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
Civil No. 18747, E.D. Pa., March 24, 1955; Associated Tel. Co. v. Communications
Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Richman Bros, v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, 114 F. Supp. 185, rehearing denied, 116 F. Supp. 800 (ND. Ohio 1953), con-
nected case, 211 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 511 (1955); Castle & Cooke
Terminals, Inc. v. Local 137, 110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953); American Optical Co.
v. Andert, 108 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Mo. 1952); General Elec. Co. v. Local Lodge 729,
Civil No. 2921, S.D. Ohio, June 25, 1952.
35
 Direct Transit Lines v. Starr, 219 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1955). The court of appeals
concluded that the federal district court had no jurisdiction and should have remanded to
the state courts. However, it declined to issue a writ of mandamus directing remand,
holding that the district court's refusal was not a final order but would be reviewable
upon appeal appropriately taken from a final judgment.
247
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Since Sinclair, federal courts in two of those states have reaffirmed
lack of federal jurisdiction" and have been joined in ordering the pro-
ceedings remanded to state courts by federal district courts in three
other states," ,rid by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Operating Eng'rs. 38 On
the other hand, federal courts in at least four states have, both prior
to and since Sinclair, permitted removal, rejected motions for remand,
and then denied injunctive relief pursuant to Norris-LaGuardia."
To fully appreciate the nature and extent of this cleavage one
need only study the situation in New York, where the United States
District Court for the Eastern District (covering, among other areas,
Brooklyn and Long Island) has in several cases granted removal,
denied remand, and then dismissed the action on the ground that
Norris-LaGuardia precluded it from granting the requested injunctive
relief." The Southern District has in at least one instance followed
American Dredging, contrary to the Eastern District, and remanded to
the New York state courts.4 ' However, in a Southern District decision
reported October 19, 1965, Judge Levet denied remand of a union's
petition to enjoin an employer lockout, allegedly in breach of contract,
and then, applying Norris-LaGuardia to the removed proceeding, denied
the injunction." Thus, whether injunctive relief is available in New
no Merchants Refrigerating Co. of Cal. v. Warehouse Union, 213 F. Supp. 177
(ND. Cal. 1963); Kroger Co, v. Retail Clerks, 56 L.R.R.M. 2893 (1964); Pullman, Inc.,
Trailmobile Div. v. International Union, UAW, Civil No. 5247, S.D. Ohio, Jan. 24,
1963.
37 Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. International Union of Dee. Workers, Civil No. 65-C-
1444, May 18, 1965, remanded, Civil No. 65-C-1528, S.D.N.Y., May 26, 1965; Acme
Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Store Employees, 231 F. Supp. 566 (D. Md. 1964) (also involved
violence during picketing); Local 227 v. Singer Co., Civil No. 10467, D. Conn., June 13,
1964.
28 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837 (3d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
33
 Publishers' Ass'n v. Pressmen's Union, 60 L.R.R.M. 2229 (Sept. 29, 1965) ; Food
Fair Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Council, 229 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (effectively
overruled by the Third Circuit in American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Operating
Eng'rs, supra note 38); Lott, Inc. v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs, 222 F. Supp. 993
(S.D. Tex. 1963) (action included prayer for damages thereby giving court discretion to
assert jurisdiction or to remand pursuant to federal removal statute, 62 Stat. 937 (1948),
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964)); Crestwood Dairy, Inc. v. Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 614
(E.D.N.Y. 1963) ; Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers, 54 L.R.R.M. 2317 (1963);
National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Heffernan, 195 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (action
included prayer for damages) ; Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Const.
Trade Council, 93 F. Supp. 217 (D. Me. 1950).
40
 Crestwood Dairy, Inc. v. Kelley, supra note 39; Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery
Drivers, supra note 39; National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Heffernan, supra note 39.
41
 Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, supra note 37.
42
 Publishers' Ass'n v. Pressmen's Union, supra note 39. The employer's success here
in the fairly unusual role of removing party may jeopardize an employer's chances of
urging lack of federal jurisdiction and remand in the more common instance where a
union is in breach of contract and seeks removal.
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York appears to depend upon the particular local court in which the
petition is filed and to which federal court removal may lie. Moreover,
at least in the Southern District (which covers, among other areas,
Manhattan and the Bronx) the availability of injunctive relief may
rest upon the designation of the particular federal judge who will hear
the matter.
It must be noted that only one case, American Dredging Co. v.
Local 25, Int'l Operating Eng'rs, 43 has reached the United States
Court of Appeals since Sinclair. In that case, the Third Circuit came
down squarely against removal. The court cited a 1926 United States
Supreme Court decision which defined the word "jurisdiction" as the
"power to entertain the suit, consider the merits and render a binding
decision thereon. . . ." (Emphasis added.) 44 In ordering remand in
American Dredging, the court pointed out that federal statutes must
be construed and applied so as to avoid absurd results and stated:
To say then that a District Court has subject matter
jurisdiction of a cause of action, so as to authorize it to take
cognizance of it under the provisions of the Removal Statute,
when it does not in the first place have jurisdiction to enter-
tain and decide it upon its merits, is to give sanction to an
exercise in futility."
By denying the petition for certiorari in American Dredging and
thereby foregoing at least one excellent opportunity to resolve the
confusion engendered by Sinclair, the Supreme Court has intensified
the rift among courts and has contributed to the practice of "forum
shopping."
Moreover, in addition to the selection of the proper forum to ob-
tain the advantage of the state court's clear right to grant an injunc-
tion," timing becomes of critical import because the injunction may
be rendered ineffectual by a successful removal to the federal courts.
For example, assuming that removal would be finally granted and re-
mand denied, a state court could grant a temporary restraining order
within one to four days following the strike in a proceeding for an
order to show cause. Strikers, under the temporary restraining order,
could be ordered back to work and union officials ordered to take ap-
propriate action to conform to the order. By the time the union removed
and argument could be heard on the remand issue (several days to
several weeks), the strike could be effectively broken.
43 Supra note 38.
44 General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926).
45
 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Intl Operating Eng'rs, supra note 38, at 842.
46
 See notes 16 & 22 supra and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, under the federal removal statute, removal by the
union will not in and of itself render invalid any prior order issued in
the state proceedings. Such orders, including injunctions, remain in
effect until dissolved or modified by the federal district court. 47 For
this reason, the restraining order could well serve an employer's interest
by putting an immediate end to the strike regardless of any eventual
adverse disposition on removal or on the merits.
III. ARBITRATOR'S INJUNCTION
In addition to court and NLRB proceedings, an arbitrator's cease
and desist order provides a third possible source of injunctive relief.
In Ruppert v. Egelhofer," the New York Court of Appeals held that
when an arbitrator enjoins a union from violating a no-strike clause,
no ground exists for invalidating the cease and desist order if it is
found that the particular bargaining agreement contemplated the inclu-
sion of that order in an arbitrator's award. The only federal case on
this issue, New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 49 supports the view taken by the
New York high court. The reasoning in both cases is that a grant of
the injunctive power to arbitrators by the parties to a collective bar-
gaining agreement is voluntary and, presumably, was bargained for
and desired by them; there would be an obvious inequity in allowing
a union to escape its voluntary agreements. Thus, inasmuch as the
parties had, by their collective bargaining agreement, authorized the
arbitrator to grant a cease and desist order against work stoppages in
violation of their contract, the respective anti-injunction acts in each
jurisdiction did not preclude a state or a federal court from enforcing
the arbitrator's order since the parties themselves, and not the court,
has sanctioned the remedy.
However, both of the above decisions pre-date Sinclair, and
whether they declare the present status of federal and state court atti-
tudes toward enforcement of an arbitrator's cease and desist orders is
uncertain. In such a situation, although a court does not issue an
injunction in the traditional sense, but merely confirms an award of
the arbitrator by ordering compliance with it, the technical distinction
is a narrow one, and such enforcement is tantamount to issuing the
injunction.
The following is a survey of several recent arbitrators' awards
seemingly enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike contract:
47 Removal Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 940 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1964).
48 3 N.Y.2d 576, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958).
40 New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 49 L.R.R.M. 2941 (1962).
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Date of	 Date of
Violation	 Award
(1) Liebman Breweries, Inc.,
35 Lab. Arb. 384 (1960)
Expedited arbitration clause	 Sept. 2	 Sept. 20
(2) Macy's New York,
40 Lab. Arb. 954 (1962)
Standard arbitration clause 	 July 16	 July 24
General American Transp.
corp.,
41 Lab. Arb. 214 (1963)
Standard arbitration clause
but a special submission
agreement was entered with
the union on Sept. 16, the day
of the strike	 Sept. 16	 Sept. 17
(4) United Parcel Service, Inc.,
41 Lab. Arb. 560 (1963)
Hearing could be called by
arbitrator designated in the
agreement upon 24 hours no-
tice, or less in an emergency	 Jan. 22	 Jan. 24
(5) Ford Motor Co.,
41 Lab. Arb. 619 (1963)	 (Date of strike
Special submission provided 	 not given)
in collective bargaining agree-
ment
(6) New York Shipping Ass'n,
41 Lab. Arb. 809 (1963)
Pursuant to grievance ma-
chinery of General Cargo
agreement. Not clear from
case whether or not this pro-




 in New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, ibid, and Ruppert
v. Egelhofer, supra note 48, a court confirmed the arbitrator's award. However, neither
this latter case nor Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, supra note 13, were discussed; and it
appears that the court did not treat the award as an injunction. In re N.Y. Shipping
Ass'n, Inc., 54 L.R.R.M. 2680 (1963).
( 3 )
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A further caveat on the New York court's decision in Ruppert is
in order. Although the contract in that case did not specifically grant
the power to issue an injunction to an arbitrator, it contained, in addi-
tion to the regular arbitration provisions which governed normal dis-
putes, a special clause requiring speedy disposition of those grievances
which resulted in stoppages or slow-downs. This enabled the court to
conclude that, according to that particular agreement, the parties con-
templated the inclusion of an injunction in the award. Therefore, the
power to issue an injunction had been impliedly conferred."
It is necessary, therefore, to compare closely the grievance-arbitra-
tion provisions of the particular contract under consideration with the
provisions in the Ruppert agreement and those in the agreements in-
volved in the other cases set forth above. If the contract has a "sense
of expedition" and gives complete authority to the arbitrator to deter-
mine what steps are to be taken to remedy the violation, it may reason-
ably provide a basis from which the courts as well as the arbitrator
may infer the power to issue a cease and desist order to enjoin a strike
in order to preserve the issues for the regular grievance procedure.
IV. ACTION FOR DAMAGE
Although not as effective as injunctive relief, damages are an
available remedy for a union's breach of a no-strike clause. The fact
that such a violation may also constitute an unfair labor practice does
not deprive the courts of jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act.'
Normally, however, the employer relinquishes his right to bring a
damage suit for violation of contract until the arbitration process has
been exhausted. Reading the Steelworkers trilogy," Drake Bakeries54
and the Sinclair°" cases conjunctively, it is concluded that, unless the
collective bargaining agreement expressly excludes the possibility that
the damage issue shall be subject to arbitration in the event of a con-
tract violation, it will be deemed arbitrable. Thus, where there is a
broad and comprehensive arbitration clause, e.g., "questions of inter-
pretation or application of any provision of this agreement" or "all
matters of controversy or dispute arising out of this Agreement or
affecting relations between the parties," the employer cannot institute
its action directly in court, as the court is likely to grant the union's
51 Ruppert v. Egelhofer, supra note 48.
52 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955); United Steelworkers v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 350, 352 (10th
Cir. 1959); Aaronson Bros. Paper Corp. v. Fishko, 144 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
286 App. Div. 1009, 146 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1955).
53 Cases cited note 15 supra.
54
 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, supra note 7.
55
 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, supra note 13.
252
ENFORCEMENT OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSE
request for a stay of the damage suit pending arbitration." The union's
breach of the no-strike clause does not constitute a repudiation or
waiver of arbitration." The amount of damages is a permissible matter
for arbitrators to decide." And, if the arbitrator decides he has au-
thority to award damages, recourse to the courts on the damage action
will be foreclosed except for proceedings to modify, vacate or enforce
the arbitration award.
In determining the elements of damages in judicial awards, courts
have included the following: wages paid to idle employees, including
overtime to make up for lost hours ; 59 loss of profits, plus actual cost
of operation or of standing by;" foreseeable consequential damages
after the termination of the strike upon proof that considerable time
would be necessary to reattract lost customers:" overhead expenses j 62
compensatory damages in general; 63 and the going concern value of a
company forced out of business by the strike, including good will."
Moreover, courts require only a reasonable estimate of damages rather
than mathematical accuracy." Courts are reluctant, though, to award
punitive damages," or attorney's fees and court costs," and generally
recognize the employer's obligation to attempt to mitigate damages."'
These limitations are relatively insignificant, however, when con-
trasted with those imposed by arbitrators. In one case, although the
arbitrator awarded damages for loss of profits incurred during the
strike period, he ruled that consequential damages sought for the period
after the strike were speculative despite evidence presented by the em-
ployer of abnormal decline in sales during that period.G'} In another
58 See, e.g., Scalzitti v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Daily Lab.
Rep., October 13, 1965 (7th Cir. 1965); Isbrandtsen Co. v. McKay, 45 CCH Lab. Cas.
50,529 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
57 Local 721 v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964) ; Drake Bakeries, Inc.
v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, supra note 7.
58 Kulukundis Shipping Co, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942) ;
Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Union, 226 F. Supp. 161 (S,D.N.Y. 1964); Marchant v.
Mead-Morrison, 252 N.Y. 284 (1929).
59
 Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Conerford, 25 L.R.R.M. 2199 (1949).
40 W.L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass.
1955), aff'd, 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956).
61 Ibid.
62
 Structural Steel & Ornamental Iron Ass'n v. Shopmens Local, 172 F. Supp. 354
(D.N.J. 1959).
63
 Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir.
1962).
64 Plumbers Union v. Dillion, 255 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1958).
65
 International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Bay City Erection Co., 300 F.2d 270
(5th Cir. 1962); United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953).
66
 Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., supra note 63.
67
 New Park Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 288 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1961);
Upholsterers' Union v. Star Upholstery, 46 L.R.R.M. 2069 (1960).
68
 Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Conerford, supra note 59.
69
 Regent Quality Furniture, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 553 (1959).
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case, actual damages were awarded for an employer's expenses incurred
in paying personnel for standing by, payments on equipment rendered
unproductive by the strike, and overtime pay for make-up work. How-
ever, the arbitrator ruled that any hiss of good will was too speculative
to be considered an appropriate element of damages. 7° Similarly, arbi-
trators have refused to award damages for loss of good will generally,
unless the employer could prove a sufficient loss of future earnings
resulting specifically from the union's breach."
Although declining to include punitive damages in his award, one
arbitrator has included, among the elements of damages awarded, extra
costs incurred when the union refused to operate presses at speeds
ordered by the employer. These included payroll costs for the rest of
the shift incurred when personnel were sent home, pressroom costs for
printing elsewhere and extra mailing costs. 72
More typical of arbitrator's awards, however, are the Brynmore
Press" and the Publishers' Ass'n74 cases. In Brynmore, the arbitrator
considered as possible items of damage the salaries of office and man-
agerial staff, depreciation of fixed assets, utilities, insurance, taxes, cost
of fringe benefits, increased storage and equipment, and loss of good
will; but he limited the total award to . $500 in view of the employer's
failure to invoke the arbitration process until four weeks after the
strike commenced, which constituted a failure to "mitigate its dam-
ages.'" In the Publishers' case, after weighing the evidence and the
various elements of damages introduced, the arbitrator concluded:
. . . the Union, however, is the responsible party and a
substantial amount of money damages must be assessed
against it. However, in light of the efforts of the officials of the
Union this amount will be less than the direct damages suf-
fered by the Publisher."
Synthesis of the above cases indicates that courts are generally
more liberal in both what will be considered a proper element of dam-
ages and in the amounts awarded. On the other hand, while most arbi-
trators appear willing to award an employer provable damages in some
amount for a union's breach of a no-strike contract, arbitrators exhibit
a general reluctance to award substantial damages, even where the
union's breach is open and flagrant.
70 American Pipe & Const. Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1126 (1964).
71 Oregonian Publishing Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 574 (1959).
72 Publishers' Ass'n, 38 Lab. Arb. 943 (1962); Publishers' Ass'n, 37 Lab. Arb. 509
(1961).
73 Brynmore Press, Inc.,' 7 Lab. Arb. 648 (1947).
74 Publishers' Ass'n, 42 Lab. Arb. 95 (1964).
75 Brynmore Press, Inc., supra note 73.
711
 Publishers' Ass'n, supra note 74, at 95.
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Moreover, in some instances of clear cut breaches of the "no-
strike" commitment, arbitrators have shied away from awarding dam-
ages altogether on the ground that the contract grievance machinery did
not expressly provide for such damages," or that the employer, though
warning the breaching union of possible "disciplinary and legal" action,
neglected to specifically warn of a damage action," or that the em-
ployer had failed to establish clearly the union's instigation or encour-
agement of the contract breach."
These decisions not only demonstrate the desirability of judicial
rather than arbitral consideration of the damage issue, but also empha-
size the need for extreme care in drafting contract language.
V. DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYEES
Although the employer has the right to discipline and even to
discharge employees who strike in breach of a contract, the employer
must ordinarily justify the kind and severity of the disciplinary action
before an arbitrator. The arbitration decisions reviewed indicate that
most arbitrators will uphold discipline meted out to employees involved
in a breach of a no-strike clause, and most appear willing to sustain
more severe penalties for the leaders of the strike or slowdown. How-
ever, when the penalty is discharge, many arbitrators, as in discharge
cases generally, find an extenuating circumstance and declare the
penalty too severe. This, of course;creates-
 potential liability for back-
pay. Occasionally, an arbitrator will find that penalties were imposed
in an unequal or discriminatory manner. Again; back pay may be in-
volved in such a decision.
A survey of twenty-one recent published awards in which arbitra-
tors have been asked to rule on. the propriety of disciplinary action
taken as a result of a violation of a no-strike clause reveals the follow-
ing: (1) In seven cases discharges were sustained; (2) in ten cases
layoff or other disciplinary action was. sustained; (3) in two cases
workers who had been discharged were reinstated without back pay.
In summary, nineteen of the twenty-one cases recognize the em-
ployer's right to administer discipline where employees strike in viola-
tion of their contract. However, in several of the cases, the arbitrators
moderated the degree of discipline imposed."
77 High Standard Mfg. Corp , 38 Lab. Arb. 509 (1961).
18 Ibid.
79 Merchants Frozen Food Div., 34 Lab. Arb. 607 (1960).
80
 Barbetta Restaurant, 42 Lab. Arb. 951 (1964) (leader discharge proper, but
discharge of other employees reduced to layoff without pay); Fruehauf Trailer Co., 42
Lab. Arb. 474 (1964) (three one-week suspensions and three thirty-day suspensions
upheld); American Transp. Corp., 42 Lab. Arb, 142 (1964) (discharge of ten leaders
justified); Mack Trucks, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 1240 (1964) (discipline upheld); Ford
Motor Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 609 (1963) (discharge of eleven leaders upheld but three
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Criteria which arbitrators have used to modify, uphold or set
aside employer disciplinary action generally include the quality of
treatment of strikers depending upon such circumstances as responsi-
bility for and leadership of the strike; the type of strike; union and
company history; condonation of strike activity through reinstatement;
and the effect of the discipline on further occurrences of a similar
nature, as well as on union and employee morale, plant harmony and
future labor-management relations.'
From the above, one may conclude that employee discipline has
been consistently upheld in varying degrees by arbitrators, absent un-
usual mitigating factors or failure of proof. Theoretically, 'therefore, it
can be a useful post-strike remedy. However, as a practical matter, the
strike settlement often includes the employer's stipulation to drop dis-
ciplinary proceedings against employees, as well as damage suits or
other formal proceedings.
Consequently, several fairly recent cases are particularly interest-
ing to employers in that the contracts which were breached limited the
arbitrator's power to second guess the degree of discipline by express
language falling into three categories: (1) Language specifying, as a
remedy, discipline or discharge in the absolute discretion of the em-
ployer, without recourse to the grievance machinery; 82 (2) language
limiting the issues subject to the arbitration process to the facts of
whether an employee actually participated in the work stoppage, and
whether the employer assessed different penalties for the same class of
acts ;ea or (3) a combination of both."
others reinstated without back pay); H. 0. Canfield Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1209 (1963)
(nine employees discharged); 'Lehich Portland Cement Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 994 (1963)
(one week disciplinary suspension of seventy employees justified); United States Steel
Corp., 40 Lab. Arb. 598 (1963) (most suspensions upheld).
81 Pittsburgh Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 598 (1960).
82 Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 1100 (1963). The contract in that case
provided that:
Article XVI Discipline and Discharge
"16.1 Any employee who engages in a strike, concerted stoppage ar con-
certed slowdown, unless permitted by Section 27.0 shall be subject to disciplinary
action or discharge without recourse to the Grievance and Arbitration provisions
of this Agreement provided however that if the Union alleges than [sic] an
employee so disciplined or discharged did not participate in such strike, stoppage
or slowdown, that fact only shall be subject to the Grievance and Arbitration
procedures of this Agreement."
Id. at 1101.
88
 Mack Trucks, Inc., supra note 80. The pertinent language is as follows:
"Section 158
The Union will not authorize or support, nor will it condone participation
by any of its members or any employees represented by it, directly or indirectly,
whether individually or in concert with others, in any strike, sitdown, slow-
down, sympathy strike, concerted refusal to work overtime, or any other kind
of work stoppage or restriction of the operations or business of the Company....
"Section 160
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The decision of the Supreme Court in Sinclair left in its wake a
continuing conflict—the conflict between the encouragement of the col-
lective bargaining and arbitration processes and the desirability of a
uniform national labor policy. Although this conflict may yet be re-
solved by judicial inventiveness or congressional mandate, either of
which could provide a measure of accommodation between Taft-Hart-
Iey and Norris-LaGuardia, currently, according to Sinclair, there is no
accommodation.
Under these circumstances it is essential that the management
attorney
(1) be familiar with the availability of injunctive relief
in the various local and state courts, as well as the federal
court policy on "removal" in those localities; and
(2) attempt to obtain favorable and carefully drawn
contract arbitration language
Any employee encouraging or participating in the aforesaid conduct shall be
subject to appropriate disciplinary penalty, including discharge. In the event that
the Company does discipline an employee for encouraging or participating
in such conduct, the only question subject to arbitration shall be:
(a) The fact of that employee's leadership or participation in such conduct
(with the understanding that leadership is subject to equal or greater penalty
than participation).
(b) Any lack of uniformity in penalties assessed for the same class of acts."
Ibid.
84 Fruehauf Trailer Co., supra note 80. The arbitrator's power was limited by a
clause which stated:
Article WI—Strikes and Lockouts
(26) It is further agreed that in all cases of an unauthorized strike, slow-
down in productions, walkout, or any unauthorized cessation of work, that the
Union shall not be liable for damage resulting from such unauthorized acts
of any employee. While the Union shall immediately undertake every reasonable
means to induce such employees to return to their jobs during such period of
unauthorized stoppage of work mentioned above, it is specifically understood
and agreed that the Company during the first twenty-four (24) hour period of
such unauthorized work stoppage shall have the sole and complete right of
discipline short of discharge, and such employees shall not be entitled to nor
have any recourse to any other provisions of this Agreement except as here-
inafter provided. After the first twenty-four (24) hour period of such stoppage,
and if such stoppage continues, however, the Company will have the sole and
complete right to immediately discharge any employee participating in any
unauthorized strike, slowdown, walkout, or any other cessation of work, and
such employee shall not be entitled to nor have recourse to any other provisions
of this Agreement except as hereinafter provided.
(27) Any employee disciplined or discharged under the terms of this Article
shall have the right to file a grievance on the following issues only, and such
grievance shall be subject to the Grievance Procedure (sic) in accordance with
Article VI hereof.
(a) That the Company was discriminatory or capricious.
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(a) to obtain'the benefits of the'quickie" arbitra-
tion injunction'procedure begotten by the Ruppert deci-
sion;
(b) to insure judicial rather than arbitral determi-
nation of the measure of strike damages; and
(c) to limit the arbitrator's power to modify dis-
ciplinary action against strikers; and
(3) support in every way possible legislative efforts to
provide for judicial injunctive relief against strikes in breach
of contract.
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